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Free and Costly Trade Credit: 
A Comparison of Small Firms
Susan Coleman * 
Barney School of Business 
University of Hartford
Trade credit is a major source of financing for small firms. This article examines the extent to 
which small firms use trade credit as well as the extent to which they use “free” versus “costly” 
trade credit. Those firms that use free trade credit make payment within the discount period. 
Alternatively, firms that use costly trade credit forego available discounts and may also make 
payment after the due date thereby incurring substantial additional costs. Results reveal that 
larger firms were more likely to use trade credit. Younger firms were more likely to be denied 
trade credit and were also more likely to pay late as were firms with a history of credit 
difficulties and those with high levels of debt. Firms owned by white women and Hispanic 
men were significantly less likely to have trade credit than firms owned by white men. Further, 
firms owned by black men were significantly more likely to be denied trade credit.
I. Introduction
Access to capital is an ongoing challenge for small firms. Unlike larger firms, small 
firms do not have access to the public debt and equity markets, major sources of funding for 
publicly held firms. Alternatively, small frnns are heavily reliant on banks for both short and 
longer term credit. Even in the case of bank borrowing, however, informational asymmetries 
may make it difficult if not impossible for some firms to borrow. This is particularly true for 
privately held firms, smaller firms, newer firms, firms with an inconsistent track record of 
profitability, or firms lacking assets that can be used as collateral. Thus, by default, trade credit 
often becomes the dominant source of external funding for many small firms. Bitler et al. 
(2001) found that 60 percent of the firms included in the 1998 Survey of Small Business
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Finances used trade credit. This level of usage was higher than for any other financial service 
with the exception of checking.
Trade credit exists when a firm buys goods or services from a supplier who does not 
require immediate payment. This transaction creates an account payable for the firm and an 
account receivable for the supplier. Many suppliers offer trade credit as a way to increase 
sales; they recognize that smaller, cash constrained firms may not have sufficient liquidity to 
make payment on demand and are required to collect their sales before paying for their 
financing. They are able to pay at designated intervals, however. T]^ically the supplier 
indicates the interval for payment, i.e. 30 days or 60 days. The supplier may also offer a 
discount for early payment. Terms of 2/10 net 30, for example, mean that the firm receives a 2 
percent discount for payment within 10 days. If the firm does not take the discoimt, it is 
nevertheless expected to pay within 30 days. Firms that fail to make payment within the 
designated payment period may incur additional penalties or interest charges for late payment 
or may be denied credit in the future.
From the firm’s standpoint, taking a discount is an attractive option because it reduces 
the cost of goods or services purchased. There is a substantial cost associated with foregoing 
available discounts, so firms with sufficient liquidity typically take them (The implicit cost of 
forgoing the discount in the instance of 2/10 net 30 is 36 percent). Throughout this article, 
“free” trade credit will refer to firms that make payment within the discount period. “Costly” 
trade credit refers to firms that pay after the end of the discount period thereby foregoing 
discounts and incurring substantial financing costs. If firms fail to make payment within the 
full payment period, they may incur additional fees and charges for late payment. Under those 
circumstances, trade credit becomes an extremely costly form of financing.
This article will use data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) to 
examine the use of trade credit by small firms. It will examine the types of firms that use trade 
credit, as well as those that take discounts and those that pay late after the end of the designated 
payment period. In particular, this research will explore differences in the use of trade credit by 
gender, race, and ethnicity. This first section has focused on the role and importance of trade 
credit to small firms. The second section presents the findings of prior research, while Section 
III provides a description of the data used for this study. Section IV includes univariate results 
using data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances. Sections V and VI describe the 
multivariate models used for this analysis and their results. The final section of the paper 
includes a discussion of findings and their implications.
I. Prior Research
Prior research has revealed both a “transactions” motive and a “financing” motive for 
the use of trade credit. Ferris (1981) was the first to put forth the transactions motive. He 
argued that trade credit allows firms to manage their cash flows more predictably and thus, 
reduce their holdings of precautionary cash balances. According to Ferris, the flow of goods 
from suppliers is unpredictable. Given this level of uncertainty, firms would need to hold 
larger cash balances if payment on delivery was required. Trade credit alleviates the need for 
holding higher cash balances and allows firms to make payments for goods at regular intervals.
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) addressed both the transactions motive and the 
financing motive for trade credit using data from the 1987 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances. They found that firms with a larger volume of purchases and greater variability in 
the timing of delivery were more likely to use trade credit to satisfy their transactions
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requirements. These firms would face a higher level of uncertainty in the flow of goods and 
payments for those goods.
In terms of the financing motive, Elliehausen and Wolken found that higher risk firms 
defined as firms having either higher debt and/or lower liquidity were more likely to use trade 
credit. They concluded that higher risk firms were more likely to be credit constrained. Thus, 
they used more costly trade credit because they could not obtain less costly bank loans. 
Alternatively, lower risk firms either use banks as a source of credit or have sufficient liquidity 
to take advantage of discounts, both of which represent less costly alternatives
Petersen and Rajan (1997) addressed the relationship between credit rationing and the 
demand for trade credit, also using the 1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances. 
They found that smaller firms and firms with shorter banking relationships were more reliant 
on trade credit. They concluded that, since trade credit is more costly than credit firom financial 
institutions, the only firms that would use it are those that are credit constrained.
In a similar study, Danielson and Scott (2000) explored the impact of credit rationing on 
the demand for trade credit using the National Federation of Independent Businesses’ 1995 
Credit, Banks, and Small Business Survey. They found that small firms were more likely to 
rank trade credit as either a primary or secondary source of capital if their most recent loan had 
been denied and if their credit needs were still unmet. They also found that younger firms and 
firms located in less concentrated banking markets were more likely to rank trade credit as a 
primary or secondary source of capital. Highly concentrated banking markets are characterized 
by a higher level of competition for business customers and, correspondingly, by greater 
availability of bank capital.
Relatively few studies have examined the relationship between gender, race, and 
ethnicity on the use of trade credit. A study by Aaronson et al. (2001) did, however, focus on 
the use of trade credit in one black and one Hispanic neighborhood in Chicago. Aaronson et al. 
found that black-owned firms used less trade credit, were less likely to take discounts, and were 
more likely to pay after the due date than white-owned firms. They also found that Hispanic- 
owned firms dealing with Hispanic-owned suppliers were more likely to receive trade credit.
Extending their study to use data fi-om the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances, 
Aaronson et al. again found that minority-owned firms were less likely to use trade credit and 
less likely to take discounts than white-owned firms. Their results also indicated that smaller 
firms and firms or owners having poor credit histories were less likely to use trade credit. 
Aaronson et al. concluded that suppliers have a monitoring advantage that allows them to 
develop specialized knowledge about an industry and firms within it. Longer supplier 
relationships add to that informational advantage and enables suppliers to judge the 
creditworthiness of firms they do business with.
II. Description of the Data
The Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), formerly called the National Survey of 
Small Business Finances, is conducted every five years by the Federal Reserve. The 1998 
Survey is the most recent for which data are publicly available. It includes balance sheet and 
income statement data on 3,561 small firms in the United States. A small firm is defined as one 
having 500 or fewer employees. The SSBF also includes information on financial services 
used and financial service providers for the included firms. Survey firms represent a random 
sample of U.S. firms stratified by size, geographic location, gender, and racial and ethmc
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identity of the firm owners. Sample weights are included so that population estimates can be 
constructed from the sample data.
Table I provides information on characteristics of firms included in the 1998 SSBF. 
The data include 2,190 firms owned by white men, 605 firms owned by white women, 195 
firms owned by black men, 209 firms owned by Hispanic men, and 153 firms owned by Asian 
men. Data were not included for black, Hispanic, or Asian women due to the relatively small 
number of minority women business owners included in the SSBF.
Table 1 reveals that the frnns owned by white men were significantly larger than firms 
owned by white women, black men, and Hispanic men in terms of total assets, total sales, and 
total number of employees. In fact, firms owned by white men were approximately twice as 
large as firms owned by white women and three times as large as firms owned by black and 
Hispanic men in terms of average total assets. A similar pattern holds for average total sales. 
Firms owned by white men were also significantly larger than firms owned by Asian men in 
terms of total assets and total employees. These distinctions are noteworthy, because prior 
research has revealed that larger fibrms are less reliant on trade credit than smaller firms firms.
Firms owned by white men were also significantly older than firms owned by the other 
four groups, having an average age of 14.55 years. Nevertheless, all of the firms were at least 
10 years old on average indicating that firms in the sample were established and had been 
operating for a period of time. In terms of owner age and experience, white male firm owners 
were significantly older and had significantly more years of business experience that other firm 
owners. The average age for a white male owner was 50.93 years. These owners, in turn, had 
an average of 19.91 years of experience. In spite of this difference, however, the average age 
for firm owners in all five groups was at least 45 indicating a relatively mature group. 
Similarly, all of the firm owners had a minimum of 14 years of business experience.
Table II continues the comparison between the different groups of small firms included 
in the 1998 SSBF. It indicates that firms owned by white men were significantly more likely to 
be organized as corporations or limited liability entities than those owned by white women or 
Hispanic men. In terms of organizational status, 48.68 percent of the firms owned by white 
men were organized as corporations compared to 37.91 percent of the firms owned by white 
women and 36.06 percent of the firms owned by Hispanic men.
A high percentage, over 80 percent, of all five groups of firms were family-owned 
firms. Firms owned by white women and those owned by black or Hispanic men were 
significantly more likely to be family-owned than those owned by white men, however. There 
were no differences between the groups in terms of educational level. In fact, over 50 percent 
of all five groups had attended college indicating a relatively well-educated group of firm 
owners.
In terms of industrial classification, firms owned by white women were significantly 
more likely to be in service lines of business than those owned by white men. Similarly, firms 
owned by white women, Hispanic men, and Asian men were significantly less likely to be in 
the fields of construction or mining. Firms owned by Asian men were significantly more likely 
to be in retailing.
Firms owned by black and Hispanic men were rated as being significantly more risky 
using Dun & Bradstreet ratings than firms owned by white men. They were also significantly 
more likely to have declared either personal or business bankruptcy. Black firm owners were 
significantly more likely to have had personal delinquencies or judgments rendered against 
them within the previous three years. Overall, firms owned by black or Hispanic men were
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significantly more likely than white men to have some history of credit difficulties. Although 
21.45 percent of the white male business owners had some history of credit difficulty, 38.70 
percent of black male business owners and 29.74 percent of Hispanic male business owners had 
a history of credit problems. A history of credit difficulties may make it more difficult for 
firms to obtain bank credit and thus more reliant on trade credit. Altematively, however, firms 
with a history of credit difficulties may also have a harder time obtaining credit fi*om suppliers.
III. Small Firms’ Use of Trade Credit
Table in  reveals that a high percentage of all small firms included in the 1998 SSBF 
used trade credit (trade). Firms owned by white men were significantly more likely to use trade 
credit than those owned by white women, black or Hispanic men, however. For white men, 
66.67 percent used trade credit compared to 53.59 percent of white women, 51.13 percent of 
black men, 46.24 percent of Hispanic men, and 60.74 percent of Asian men. Black men were 
significantly more likely to have been denied trade credit than white men (denytrade). 
Although only 4.80 percent of white men had been denied trade credit, 12.84 percent of black 
men had been denied. Black men were also significantly more likely to pay off their trade 
credit accounts late (paylate); 42.11 percent of white men had paid late compared to 61.69 
percent of black men.
Table III also reveals that white male owners financed a significantly higher percentage 
of their purchases with trade credit than the other four types of firm owners (trade%). White 
male owners financed 72.10 percent of their purchases with trade credit compared to 66.91 
percent for white women, 61.57 percent for black men, 58 percent for Hispanic men, and 54.24 
percent for Asian men. Further, white men took a significantly higher percentage of the cash 
discounts available to them (cashdisc) than black or Asian men. The fact that white men and 
white women took such a high percentage of cash discounts (60.01 percent and 64.01 percent) 
suggests that they were aware of the cost associated with foregoing discounts. Similarly, black, 
Hispanic, and Asian men all took at least 40 percent of the discounts offered. In spite of this 
awareness, however, firms included in the SSBF paid off a relatively high percentage of trade 
balances late (%late), approximately 30 percent for all five groups. The fact that such a high 
percentage of small fiirms pay balances late suggests that they use trade credit as a source of 
financing in addition to using it to satisfy their transactions needs.
Table IV compares key fmancial ratios for those small firms that were users of trade 
credit. Both mean and median amounts are shown, since mean amounts were skewed in some 
instances. Total accounts payable (acctpay) and the ratio of accounts payable to total assets 
(apassts) are both indicators of the extent to which firms use trade credit. Although white 
male-owned firms had significantly higher levels of accounts payable, their ratio of accounts 
payable to total assets was not significantly higher than for the other four groups of firms. 
Values ranged firom a low of 12.5 percent for firms owned by Asian men to 17.6 percent for 
firms owned by white men.
The level of inventories (inv) and the ratio of inventories to assets (invassts) are 
indicative of the extent to which a firm might need trade credit. One would assume that firms 
with higher levels of inventory would have higher transactions requirements. Similarly, the 
inventory turnover ratio (invtum) provides a measure of the speed with which firms sell their 
products. A higher turnover would suggest the need for more fi*equent shipments of inventory 
and, thus, more fi*equent pa)mients if cash were paid on delivery. The use of trade credit would
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be particularly beneficial in smoothing the cash flow cycles of firms that have large and rapidly 
moving inventories.
Table IV reveals that although white males had significantly higher levels of inventories 
than the other four types of firms, they did not have a significantly higher ratio of inventory to 
assets. For that ratio, values ranged from a low of 14.6 percent for firms owned by black men 
to a high of 21.7 percent for firms owned by Asian men. In terms of inventory turns, firms 
owned by Hispanic men had the highest average inventory turn, 21.8, followed by white men 
with an inventory turn of 18.4.
The ratio of total debt to total assets (TDTA) and the quick ratio (quickrat) are measures 
of credit quality and liquidity. One would anticipate that firms with a high debt ratio would 
have a difficult time obtaining additional bank financing. Thus, trade credit might serve as an 
altemative source of financing. Alternatively, however, if suppliers have “insider information” 
about the credit quality of the firm, they might be reluctant to extend trade credit. Table IV 
reveals that firms owned by white women and those owned by Asian men had sigmficantly 
lower ratios of total debt to total assets than firms owned by white men. Mean levels ranged 
from a low of 42.8 percent for Asian men to a high of 54.9 percent for Hispanic men.
A low quick ratio could be indicative of a cash shortage. Firms in this position would 
have a particularly difficult time paying for goods on delivery. This disadvantage could cause 
them to rely more heavily on trade credit. Simultaneously, it could also mean that they are less 
able to take advantage of discounts meaning that trade credit would become a “costly” rather 
than a “free” source of financing. Table IV reveals that firms owned by white men, white 
women, and black men had higher average quick ratios than firms owned by Hispanic and 
Asian men. Values for this ratio were highly skewed, however, and there were no significant 
differences between the five groups of firms.
Another factor that may affect a firm’s use of trade credit is its ability to obtain bank 
financing. Firms that are able to obtain bank loans may still be willing to use “free” trade 
credit, but they may be reluctant to use “costly” trade credit given that bank financing is 
typically much less expensive. Altematively, firms that have been denied bank credit may be 
more heavily reliant on both “free” and “costly” trade credit because they do not have other 
sources of financing.
Table V reveals that firms owned by white women were significantly less likely to have 
applied for a loan within the previous three years than white men (mrlapp). Although 24.4 
percent of white men had applied for loans, only 19.9 percent of white women had done so. In 
terms of loan approvals, black, Hispanic, and Asian men were significantly more likely to have 
been tumed down for a loan (mrldeny) within the previous three years than white men. 
Although only 6.4 percent of the white men and 4.9 percent of the white women were denied a 
loan, 19.6 percent of black men, 12.8 percent of Hispanic men, and 11.5 percent of Asian men 
were denied loans. Further, white women, black men and Hispanic men were significantly less 
likely than white men to have applied for a loan at all because they assumed that they would be 
denied (noapply). One would anticipate that firms that are less likely to apply for loans or 
those that are less likely to obtain them would be more reliant on trade credit. If this is the 
case, one would expect that white women, black, Hispanic, and Asian men would have a 
greater demand for trade credit.
Prior research has suggested that the nature of the banking market also has an effect on 
both the availability of bank credit and the desire for trade credit (Danielson & Scott, 2000). 
Banking markets that are highly concentrated would consist of many competing financial
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institutions offering loans at a reasonable price. This should lessen the demand for trade credit. 
Similarly, firms located in urban areas should have access to a broader array of bank credit 
providers than those in more rural areas. Table V reveals that a significantly lower percentage 
of firms owned by Hispanic and Asian men were located in highly concentrated areas as 
measured by the Herfindahl index (concent). Firms owned by black, Hispanic, and Asian men 
were significantly more likely to be located in urban areas, however (urban). This apparent 
contradiction may suggest that, although minority-owned firms were more likely to be located 
in densely populated urban areas, those areas tended to be served by fewer banks.
A final measure of the availability of bank credit was the length of the firm’s 
relationship with its primary financial provider (relation). Petersen and Rajan (1997) contend 
that longer banking relationships increase the availability of credit. Given that, firms that have 
longer banking relationships should have an easier time obtaining bank loans and thus be less 
dependent on trade credit as a source of financing. Table V indicates that firms owned by 
white men had sigmficantly longer banking relationships than those owned by white women or 
by black, Hispanic, or Asian men. This would suggest that, although white men might use 
“firee” trade credit to satisfy their transactions need, they would be less likely to use “costly” 
trade credit as a source of financing.
rv. Multivariate Analysis
The univariate analysis provided above suggests differences in the use of trade credit by 
gender, race, and ethnicity. Prior research also suggests that a firm’s use of trade credit is a 
function of owner characteristics such as education and experience, firm characteristics such as 
firm size and firm age, or characteristics that might affect the firm’s banking relationships. 
Multivariate analysis was used to test these theories using three different groups of independent 
variables. Unlike univariate analysis which tests the effect of one variable on the dependent 
variable, multivariate analysis tests the effect of several independent variables acting in concert 
on the dependent variable. In each case the dependent variable was a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether or not the firm used trade credit (trade).
The first set of independent variables represented characteristics of the firm owner 
including age, educational level, years of experience, gender, race, and ethnicity. The 
hypotheses being tested was that owner characteristics could affect either the owner’s 
willingness to use trade credit or his or her ability to secure it. Age was selected as an 
independent variable, because prior research indicates that risk aversion increases with age 
(Morin & Suarez, 1983; Riley & Chow, 1992). Given that, one would anticipate that older firm 
owners may be less willing to use any type of short term debt that could increase the riskiness 
of the firm. Alternatively, younger firm owners may have more ambitious growth objectives 
and may thus be more receptive to using all available sources of financing including trade 
credit. In light of the fact that trade credit is a “fi*ee” source of financing if paid off within the 
payment period, one would assume that more highly educated firm owners as well as those 
with more experience would be more aware of its benefits and would prefer it over interest- 
bearing sources.
Prior research has suggested that women small business owners are less likely to apply 
for loans than men (Coleman, 2002a). Further, prior research indicates that minority firm 
owners are less likely to use trade credit than white firm owners (Aronson et al., 2001). These 
findings justify the inclusion of variables representing gender, race, and ethnicity. Since 
univariate results indicate that the size of firms included in the sample varied considerably by
81
82
gender and minority status, these variables were interacted with the size variable (logsales). 
Sizeww is a variable representing the interaction of firm size and a variable representing white 
women, while sizebm, sizehm, and sizeam represent the interaction of firm size with variables 
representing black men, Hispanic men, and Asian men respectively. The variable representing 
the interaction of size and white men was omitted fi*om the model to serve as a reference.
A logistic regression model was developed having the following form:
Model 1: Owner Characteristics
Trade - a  + Z?iownage + Z>2ed + Z>3exp + Z?4sizeww + Z s^sizebm + ^esizehm + Z^ysizeam + e
Logistic regression analysis was used in this instance since the dependent variable was 
dichotomous rather than continuous (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Cramer, 1991; Demaris, 1992).
A second logistic regression model was developed, also using trade as the dependent 
variable, but with independent variables representing characteristics of the firm. It seems 
reasonable to assume that characteristics of the firm would affect its demand for or ability to 
secure trade credit. The independent variables in this model included firm age, firm size, 
organizational status, MSA designation, and industry sector. Prior research indicates that 
younger firms and smaller firms are more reliant on trade credit as a source of financing 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Danielson & Scott, 2000), possibly because they do not qualify for 
bank loans. Organizational status was also included as an independent variable to determine if 
firms organized as corporations have less demand for trade credit, because they are more 
attractive to banks. Similarly, MSA designation was included to determine if firms operating in 
urban areas are less likely to use trade credit, because there is greater availability of bank credit. 
Variables representing industry sector were included, because one would assume that sectors 
having higher levels of inventory would have a higher demand for trade credit. The variable 
representing firms in the manufacturing sector (manuf) was omitted to serve as a reference.
The second logistic regression model took the following form:
Model 2: Firm Characteristics
Trade = a + Z?ifirmage + Wogsales + Z^ sorg + urban + Z^ sserv + Z?6transp + Z^ yretail + Z>ginsre + 
Z>9C o n sm in  +  e
Finally, a third model was developed representing aspects of the firm’s banking 
relationships as well as financial ratios that might affect the banking relationship and, by 
extension, the demand for trade credit. The independent variables in this model included the 
length of the firm’s primary banking relationship, the degree of bank concentration, whether or 
not the firm was turned down for its most recent loan, credit history, and financial ratios 
representing leverage, liquidity, and the level of inventories.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) found that firms with longer banking relationships were 
more likely to use bank loans and were less dependent on trade credit as a source of financing. 
Danielson and Scott (2000) found that firms in highly concentrated banking markets had 
greater access to bank loans, probably due to the higher level of competition. Loan denials
were used as an independent variable, because it seems reasonable to assume that firms that 
have been denied bank loans would be more dependent on trade credit.
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) found that riskier firms defined as firms having higher 
levels of debt or low liquidity were more reliant on trade credit, possibly because they were less 
attractive to banks. Finally, one would anticipate that firms with high relative levels of 
inventory or high inventory turnover would use a higher level of trade credit to finance those 
inventories.
The third logistic regression model took the following form:
Model 3: Banking Relationships and Financial Ratios
Trade = a + Z?irelation + Z?2c0ncent + Z^smrldeny + Z?4badcred + Z>sTDTA + ^eQuickrat + 
Z?7invassts + Z^ginvtum + e
The variables in all three models are listed and defined in Appendix A. A correlation 
analysis indicated that the independent variables used were not highly correlated with each 
other or with the dependent variable.
V. Results
Results of the logistic regression analyses are shown in Table VI. The first model 
examined the effect of owner characteristics on the firm’s use of trade credit. Significant 
independent variables included owner age (-) and years of experience (+); younger owners and 
owners with more experience were more likely to use trade credit. Younger owners may be 
less risk averse and thus more willing to take on debt, including short term debt in the form of 
trade credit. Similarly, younger owners may have more aggressive goals relating to growth and 
may thus require additional financing in the form of trade credit. Owners with more experience 
may have a greater awareness of the value of fi-ee trade credit compared to interest-bearing 
bank loans.
The variables representing the interaction of firm size and white women (sizeww) and 
firm size and Hispanic men (sizehm) were significant and negative indicating that these groups 
were significantly less likely to use trade credit than comparably sized firms owned by white 
men. Within the context of this model, we cannot determine if this is the case because they 
prefer to use less trade credit or if it is because they are more likely to be denied trade credit. 
The signs for sizebm and sizeam were also negative but not significant.
In terms of firm characteristics (Model 2), larger firms and firms organized as 
corporations were significantly more likely to use trade credit. Larger firms may have the 
market power necessary to demand credit from suppliers. Similarly, firms organized as 
corporations may give the impression of being more firmly established and may thus be in a 
better position to secure trade credit. The industry sectors representing service, transportation, 
retail, and insurance/real estate were all significantly less likely to use trade credit than 
manufacturing firms. This finding is not surprising given that one would expect manufacturers 
to carry relatively high levels of inventory.
The third model examined the effect of bank relationships and fmancial ratios. Results 
indicate that firms with longer banking relationships were significantly more likely to use trade 
credit. It is possible that firms that are capable of establishing long term relationships with
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banks will also be more likely to establish positive relationships with suppliers. Table VI also 
indicates that firms with a history of credit difficulties (badcred) and Wgh levels of leverage 
(TDTA) were more likely to use trade credit. Since these same firms might experience greater 
difficulty in securing bank loans, it is reasonable to expect that they would turn to trade credit 
as an alternative source of short term borrowing.
Table VI reveals that firms with a higher level of liquidity (quickrat) were more likely 
to use trade credit. This suggests that suppliers may have “inside information” on buyer firms 
that enables them to distinguish between those firms that will be able to make payments on 
time and those that will not. Finally, firms with higher levels of inventory (invassts) and higher 
inventory tums (invtum) were significantly more likely to use trade credit as hypothesized. 
One would expect to find that such firms would have a greater demand for trade credit to 
satisfy their transactions requirements..
VI. Further Analysis
As if often the case, the results of the regression analyses thus far have raised as many 
questions as they have answered. Specifically, why do firms owned by white women and 
Hispanic men use less trade credit than firms owned by white men? Further, for those firms 
that do use trade credit, how do they use it? Is it a source of liquidity as Ferris (1981) suggests, 
or is it a source of financing (Elliehausen & Wolken, 1993; Petersen & Rajan, 1997)? To 
explore these questions, three additional dependent variables were tested in each of the three 
models representing owner characteristics, firm characteristics, and bank relationships and 
financial ratios. The second dependent variable tested was a dichotomous variable representing 
whether or not the firm had been denied trade credit (denytrade). Firms that are denied trade 
credit are also very likely to be denied credit fi*om banks for the same reasons. One would 
anticipate that such firms would be rather severely credit constrained given that they are unable 
to obtain credit from the two dominant sources of short term fmancing for small firms. The 
third dependent variable was also a dichotomous variable representing payment after the due 
date (paylate). Firms that pay suppliers after the due date not only lose the benefit of a discount 
for early payment, but they may also incur late fees and/or interest charges and perhaps even be 
denied trade credit in the future if the lateness of payment is very pronounced. At that point, 
previously firee trade credit can become very costly.
Logistic regression models were developed in which either denytrade or paylate were 
the dependent variables. These models took the following form:
Model 1: Owner Characteristics
Denytrade (or paylate) = a + Z>iownage + Z?2ed + Z?sexp + Z>4sizeww + Z?ssizebm + Z?6sizehm + 
Z>7 s iz e a m  +  e
Model 2: Firm Characteristics
Denytrade (or paylate) = a + ^ifirmage + Z?2logsales + Z?3org + urban + ^sserv + Z?6transp + 
Z>7r e ta il +  ^ g in sre  +  Z>9 C o n sm in  +  e
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Model 3: Banking Relationships and Financial Ratios
Denytrade (or paylate) = a + Z>irelation + ^2Concent + Z?3mrldeny + Z?4badcred + Z s^TDTA + 
Z>6quickrat + ftyinvassts + ^^ginvtum + e
Results for these additional models are also provided in Table VI. For the models using 
denytrade as the dependent variable the owner characteristic representing experience was 
significant and negative; firm owners with fewer years of experience were significantly more 
likely to be turned down for trade credit. The variable representing black men was significant 
and positive indicating that black men were more likely to be tumed down for trade credit than 
white men. Results for white women, Hispanic men, and Asian men were not significant.
In terms of firm characteristics, younger firms (firmage) were significantly more likely 
to be tumed down as were firms organized as corporations and firms located in urban areas. 
Service firms were significantly more likely to be tumed down than manufacturing firms, while 
firms in the transportation, retail, and insurance/real estate industries were less likely to be 
tumed down.
Finally, in the area of banking relationships, firms that had been denied loans, those that 
had a history of bad credit, and those that had high levels of debt were also significantly more 
likely to be tumed down for trade credit. This finding again suggests that suppliers may have 
insider information on the financial condition of firms that enables them to discriminate 
between good credit risks and bad ones.
Turning to the models that used paylate as the dependent variable, the owner 
characteristic representing age (ownage) was significant and negative. Younger firm owners 
were significantly more likely to pay late. In addition, firms headed by Hispamc men were 
significantly less likely to pay after the due date. Variables representing white women, black 
men, and Asian men were not significant.
The firm characteristics representing firm age (-), firm size (+), and organizational 
status (+) were all significant revealing that younger firms, larger firms, and firms organized as 
corporations were all more likely to pay late. Younger firms may pay late because they may be 
going through a growth stage and may be constrained for cash. Altematively, younger firms 
may be less attractive to banks because they do not have a track record. Thus, they may be 
more dependent on trade credit as a source of financing. Larger firms and firms organized as 
corporations may pay late because they have sufficient market power to do so. Firms in the 
service, transportation, retail, and insurance/real estate industries were all significantly less 
likely to pay late than firms in the manufacturing industry suggesting that manufacturers may 
be more heavily dependent on trade credit as a source of financing. It may also mean (and is 
likely) that manufacturing firms have a longer working capital cycle.
Results of the third model which included characteristics of the banking relationship 
and fmancial ratios indicate that the variables representing loan denials, credit history, and 
leverage were significant and positive. Firms that had been denied loans, those with a history 
of credit difficulties, and those with higher levels of debt were more likely to pay late. This 
finding is not surprising given that one would expect that such firms might have a more 
difficult time obtaining bank credit. In all likelihood they are forced to rely on trade credit as 
source of financing. Firms with higher quick ratios, higher ratios of inventories to assets, and 
higher inventory turns were also significantly more likely to pay after the end of the payment 
period. It is possible that firms with high levels of inventories and high inventory tums are
more dependent on trade credit as a source of financing. These firms may have higher levels of 
liquidity precisely because they do not take advantage of discounts to pay early.
As a fmal step in the analysis of small firms’ use of trade credit, three regression models 
were developed to explore the extent to which frnns take advantage of cash discoimts for early 
payment. As noted above, foregoing available discounts represents a substantial economic cost 
to the firm. In light of that, firms that are in a position to do so should logically be expected to
take a high percentage of available discounts.
A fourth dependent variable representing the percentage of cash discounts taken 
(cashdisc) was included in three models representing owner characteristics, firm characteristics, 
and bank relationships and financial ratios. Since the dependent variable was continuous in this 
instance, regression models were used rather than logistic regression models. The models took 
the following form:
Model 1: Owner Characteristics
Cashdisc = a + Z>iOwnage + Z>2ed + ^^ sexp + Z?4sizeww + ^ssizebm + Z?6sizehm + b’jsizcam + e
Model 2: Firm Characteristics
Cashdisc = a + Z?ifirmage + Z?2logsales + Z^ sorg + Z>4 urban -i- Z>5serv + betransp + Z>7retail + 
ftginsre + Z^ pconsmin + e
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Model 3: Banking Relationships and Financial Ratios
Cashdisc = a + Z i^relation + Z>2Concent + Z s^mrldeny + Z>4badcred + Z s^TDTA + Z>6quickrat + 
ftyinvassts + Z>ginvtum + e
Results of the regression analyses are included in Table VII. In terms of owner 
characteristics, the variable representing years of experience (exp) was significant and positive. 
Firm owners having a greater amount of experience took a higher percentage of discounts, 
possibly because they had a greater appreciation for the financial advantages of doing so. 
Variables representing firms owned by black men and firms owned Asian men were significant 
and negative indicating that these firms took a lower percentage of available discounts than 
firms of comparable size owned by white men. The variable representing firms owned by 
Hispanic men was also negative, but not significant.
Within the category of firm characteristics, older firms and firms located in non-urban 
areas took a significantly higher percentage of cash discounts. It is possible that more mature 
firms are not growing as rapidly; they have more cash on hand that can be used to pay suppliers 
within the discount period. Mature firms may also be more aware of the cost of not taking 
discounts. Non-urban firms may take a higher percentage of cash discounts, because they are 
able to develop closer relationships with local banks willing to act as a source of short term 
credit. This may provide these firms with a source of liquidity that allows them to pay within 
the discount period. Table VII also indicates that manufacturing firms took a significantly
lower percentage of available discounts than firms in any of the other industries. This finding 
reinforces a point made earlier to the effect that manufacturing firms may be more likely to use 
trade credit as a source of financing. Manufacturing firms have a longer working capital cycle 
and are unable to get the cash in sufficient time to avail themselves of the discount.
Finally, in the model with variables representing characteristics of the bank relationship 
and financial ratios, the variable representing length of the primary banking relationship 
(relation) was significant and positive. This suggests that firms with longer banking 
relationships are able to take a higher percentage of discounts because they have an alternative 
source of short term credit in the form of bank loans. In this same model the variables 
representing credit quality (badcred) and financial leverage (TDTA) were significant and 
negative. Firms with a history of credit difficulties and those with high levels of debt took a 
lower percentage of available cash discounts, in all probability because they did not have the 
financial means to pay early.
Vn. Summary and Discussion
This research has examined the extent to which small firms use trade credit and, for those 
that do use trade credit, the extent to which they use “free” versus “costly” trade credit. A 
shortcoming of this analysis is that it uses data exclusively from the 1998 SSBF. Since 
additional surveys were conducted using 1987 and 1993 data, a comparison of the three 
different data sets could be illuminating and certainly provides an opportunity for further 
research. Although the survey data are not identical from year to year^ there are enough 
similarities to allow for comparison. The economic and competitive environments differed 
dramatically, however, from one survey to the next.
The 1998 survey was conducted in the seventh year of an economic expansion. In this 
environment characterized by prosperity and optimism, one would anticipate that both trade 
credit and bank credit would be relatively accessible. In contrast, the 1993 survey was 
conducted just at the point where the economy was emerging from a recession. Some regions 
of the country, most notably New England, were still in recession. In an environment of this 
type, one would anticipate a greater reluctance to lend on the part of both suppliers and banks, 
particularly to smaller firms that are more susceptible to economic shocks. From 1987 to 1998 
there was also a tremendous amoimt of bank consolidation resulting in a dramatic reduction in 
the number of financial institutions. If this led to a reduction in the availability of bank credit, 
it could potentially result in a greater reliance on trade credit by small firms. A study focusing 
on inter-period comparisons would serve to highlight the effect of some of these economic and 
competitive changes over time.
For purposes of this analysis using the 1998 siuvey data, the use of trade credit was 
evaluated using two dependent variables, trade and denytrade. The variable trade indicates that 
the firm does or does not use trade credit. Similarly, the variable denytrade indicates that the 
firm has or has not been denied trade credit. Results of these two multivariate analyses indicate 
that firms owned by white women and firms owned by Hispanic men were significantly less 
likely to use trade credit than comparably sized firms owned by white men. Firms owned by 
black men were significantly more likely to be denied trade credit than those owned by white 
men, a finding that may be indicative of a credit constraint given that trade credit is one of the 
major sources of short term financing for small firms. Firms owned by black men and those
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 ^For example, the coding for gender and minority-status differs somewhat jfrom the 1993 to the 1998 survey. In 
addition, there were differences in the questions pertaining to the use o f trade credit.
owned by Asian men also took a significantly lower percentage of available cash discounts 
revealing that these firms were using a higher percentage of “costly” rather than “free” trade 
credit.
The results of this analysis also indicated that younger and more experienced firm 
owners, larger firms, and firms organized as corporations were more likely to use trade credit. 
Conversely, fum owners with less experience were more likely to be denied as were the owners 
of younger firms. These results suggest that, consistent with prior research on bank fmancing, 
younger, smaller firms also have a more difficult time securing short term credit in the form of 
trade credit.
It appears that the credit quality of the firm and its ability to repay debt are important 
determinants of a firm’s use of trade credit and its ability to secure it. Firms with a history of 
credit difficulties and those with a high ratio of total debt to total assets were more likely to 
have trade credit, probably because they need it as a source or financing. Those same firms, 
however, were more likely to be turned down for trade credit, because they represent more 
questionable credit risks.
Firms with a higher level of liquidity are more likely to have trade credit, possibly 
because they are in a better position to make payments. In addition, firms with higher levels of 
inventory and higher inventory turns were more likely to have trade credit which provides them 
with a means for addressing their transactions needs. Interestingly enough, firms with high 
levels of inventory and high inventory turns also took a significantly lower percentage of 
available discounts suggesting that they use trade credit as a source of financing as well.
As noted earlier in this paper, failure to pay within the discount period or payment after 
the due date substantially raises the cost of trade credit. In particular, giving up discoimts is a 
very costly practice. Thus, one would anticipate that firms having the means to do so would 
take them. Paying late may incur yet further late fees and interest charges adding to the cost of 
trade credit. The use of “costly” rather than “free” trade credit was measured in this analysis 
using models having the variables paylate and cashdisc as dependent variables.
Results indicate that more experienced firm owners and the owners of older firms took a 
higher percentage of cash discounts. Experienced firm owners may have a greater awareness of 
the value of discounts and the cost of foregoing them. Experienced firm owners were also 
significantly less likely to pay late thereby avoiding more costly forms of trade credit. Older 
firms may be in a better position to take discounts because they are no longer growing as 
rapidly. Thus, they may not be as cash constrained as younger firms. To reinforce this point, 
younger firms were also significantly more likely to pay late after then end of the payment 
period. Interestingly, firms owned by Hispanic men were significantly less likely to pay late 
than comparably sized firms owned by white men. This may suggest a greater reliance on trade 
credit for these particular firms if Hispanic men did not want to risk alienating suppliers by 
paying late.
Finally, firms with no history of credit difficulties and those with lower ratios of total 
debt to total assets took a higher percentage of discounts. These were obviously firms that had 
a greater willingness and ability to pay within the discount period. Conversely, firms with a 
history of credit difficulties and high levels of leverage were significantly more likely to pay 
late.
These results indicate that banking relationships are an important determinant of a 
firm’s ability to benefit from cash discounts. Firms with longer banking relationships took a 
higher percentage of cash discounts, possibly because they had another source for short term
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credit. Alternatively, firms that had been turned down for their most recent loan were 
significantly more likely to pay late.
Overall, these results suggest that short term bank credit and trade credit are not 
necessarily substitutes for each other for many small firms. These results reveal that smaller 
firms are less likely to have trade credit. In addition, younger firms and firms with a history of 
credit difficulties or high levels of debt are less likely to be approved for trade credit. These are 
the same types of firms that are more likely to be turned down for short term bank credit 
suggesting that firms having these characteristics do, indeed, face credit constraints (Coleman, 
2002b).
These results also reveal differences by gender, race, and ethnicity that echo recent 
findings on small firms’ use of bank loans. It appears that women and minority men are less 
likely to use trade credit as a source of financing. Further, black men are more likely to be 
turned down. This implies that these groups, who face greater difficulty in securing bank credit 
(Coleman, 2002c), may also face barriers to securing trade credit separate fi*om the 
characteristics of tiie firm. If this is the case, it places them at a serious disadvantage. Further 
research is required to explore these issues and questions more fully.
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Table I
Characteristics Firms included in 1998 SSBF: Mean Values
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Variable
N
Totassts
Totsales
Totemp
White
Men
2190
Mean $519,018 
Median $67,877
Mean $1,226,729 
Median $195,026
Mean 9.85 
Median 4.0
Firmage (yrs)
Mean 14.55 
Median 12.0
Ownage (yrs)
Mean 50.93 
Median 50
Exp
Mean 19.91 
Median 20.0
White
Women
605
$241,811**
$39,919
$585,144**
$91,593
6.26**
3.0
11.44**
9.0
49.27**
49.0
15.03**
13.0
Black
Men
195
$142,229**
$38,456
$357,236**
$73,466
5.57**
3.0
12.01* *
9.0
49.52*
50.0
15.88**
14.0
Hispanic
Men
209
$391,112**
$119,626
6.02* *
3.0
11.34**
9.0
47.85**
48.0
16.26**
15.0
Asian
Men
153
$147,748** $346,558* 
$34,700 $65,000
$818,775
$250,000
7.28**
4.0
10.01* *
9.0
46.84**
46.0
14.47**
14.0
*differences from white men significant at the .05 level
♦♦differences from white men significant at the .01 level
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Characteristics of Firms included in 1998 SSBF
Table II
Variable
N
Org
Family
Ed
Serv
Manuf
Transp
InsRE
Retail
ConsMin
HighRisk
Bankrupt
DelinqP
DelinqB
Judge
BadCred
White
Men
2190
48.68
87.35
53.66
40.10
8.96
3.67
6.94
25.46
14.85
27.04
2.29
11.32
13.41
3.55
21.45
White Black Hispanic Asian
Women Men Men Men
605 195 209 153
Percentage o f  Total
37.91** 43.67 36.06** 45.85
91.70** 93.47** 94.23** 84.25
55.78 51.98 53.75 55.87
49.15** 46.54 46.17 48.35
7.74 5.81 10.64 5.98
3.59 4.45 5.21 3.99
5.97 6.96 4.61 2.21
26.98 23.77 25.54 34.76*
5.79** 11.93 7.45* 4.70**
28.93 44.03** 38.77** 27.02
2.03 4.98* 4.96* 1.01
11.15 27.49** 13.86 12.43
12.15 20.23 17.38 8.75
2.77 9.53** 6.06 2.59
19.44 38.70** 29.74* 18.71
♦differences from white men significant at the .05 level 
**differences from white men significant at the .01 level
Table HI
Use of Trade Credit by Firms included in 1998 SSBF
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Variable White White Black Hispanic Asian
Men Women Men Men Men
N 2190 605 195 209 153
Percentage o f Total
Trade 66.67% 53.59%** 51.13%** 46.24%** 60.74%
Denytrade 4.80% 5.51% 12.84%** 6.90% 4.71%
Paylate 42.11% 45.01% 61.69%** 35.28% 46.34%
Mean Amount
Trade% 72.10% 66.91%** 61.57%** 58.00%** 54.24%**
Numsupp 25.45 25.59 10.97 10.94 14.52
Cashdisc 60.01% 64.09% 48.85%* 52.84% 41.47%**
%late 30.83% 33.48% 32.46% 35.24% 2835%
♦differences from white men significant at the .05 level 
♦♦differences from white men significant at the .01 level
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Table IV
Key Variables for Firms Using Trade Credit
Variable
N
Acctpay
White
Men
1676
Mean $106,549 
Median $19,526
AP/Assts
Inv
Mean 0.176 
Median 0.059
Mean $131,857 
Median $7,873
Inv/Assts
Mean 0.175 
Median 0.055
InvTum
TDTA
Mean 18.420 
Median 5.178
Mean 0.494 
Median 0.538
Quickrat
Mean 3.057 
Median 0.593
White
Women
367
$36,276**
$4,000
0.144
0.035
$53,607**
$5,027
0.216
0.080
13.771
3.257
0.458*
0.427
3.164
0.150
Black
Men
105
$31,559**
$3,000
0.174
0.041
$33,216**
$1,834
0.146
0.024
14.334
1.666
0.488
0.132
3.874
0.057
Hispanic
Men
106
$61,043*
$5,000
0.160
0.028
$25,098**
$2,750
0.155
0.028
21.810
6.258
0.549
0.146
1.216
0.157
Asian
Men
104
$95,662
$3,500
0.125
0.023
$91,934
$3,448
0.217
0.028
13.143
1.600
0.428*
0.483
1.429
0.081
**differences from white men significant at the .05 level 
**differences from white men significant at the .01 level.
Table V
Borrowing Experience of Small Firms by Gender, Race, and Ethnicity
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Variable
N
White
Men
2190
White
Women
605
Black
Men
195
Percentage o f Firms
Hispanic
Men
209
♦differences from white men significant at the .05 level 
**differences from white men significant at the .01 level
Asian
Men
153
Mrlapp 24.4% 19.9%* 31.1% 23.8% 24.6%
Mrldeny 6.4% 4.9% 19.6%** 12.8%** H.5%*
Noapply 20.8% 25.5%** 53.3%** 29.1%** 22.6%
Concent 53.88% 54.70% 51.54% 45.14%* 32.70%**
Urban 78.7% 80.2% 90.6%** 92.5%** 95.7%**
number of months
Relation 98.30 82.89* 77.39** 66.94** 82.99*
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Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
(Values reported are Parameter Estimates)
Table VI
Trade DenyTrade PayLate
Variable
Owner Characteristics 
Intercept 
Ownage 
Ed 
Exp
SizeWW
SizeBM
SizeHM
SizeAM
Firm Characteristics 
Intercept 
Firmage 
Logsales 
Org 
Urban 
Serv 
Transp 
Retail 
InsRe 
ConsMin
0.9780**
-0.0160**
0.1229
0.0202* *
-0.0226**
-0.0279
-0.0575**
- 0.0022
-3.1825**
-0.0024
0.3802**
0.4396**
-0.1314
-0.9079**
-1.9622**
-0.7590**
-2.0216**
0.0340
-2.2429**
-0.0105
0.2738
-0.0201*
0.0099
0.0865**
0.0192
-0.0058
-2.5674**
-0.0309**
0.0133
0.4186*
0.4380*
0.2332**
-1.4606**
-0.5212*
-1.5341**
-0.3135
-0.3612
-0.0156**
-0.0836
-0.0103*
-0.0018
0.0322
-0.0510**
0.0095
-3.6937**
-0.0120* *
0.2453**
0.3812**
0.0242
-0.3297*
-0.9440**
-0.3638*
-1.4563**
-0.0344
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Variable
Bank Relationships 
and Financial Ratios
Intercept
Relation
Concent
Mrldeny
Badcred
TDTA
Quickrat
Invassts
Invtum
Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
(Values reported are Parameter Estimates)
Table VI (cont.)
Trade
-0.3245**
0.0009**
-0.0166
-0.1078
0.3247**
0.8959**
0.0232**
0.6916**
0.0111* *
DenyTrade
-3.6312**
-0.0004
-0.0732
0.8633**
1.2038**
0.7378**
-0.0028
-0.1485
-0.0026
PayLate
-2.1370**
-0.0004
-0.0320
0.3501*
1.2510**
1.0901**
0.0102* *
0.6389**
0.0046**
♦results significant at the .05 level 
**results significant at the .01 level
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Results of Regression Analyses 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Available Cash Discounts Taken
Parameter Est. Prob>t
Table VII
Variable
Owner Characteristics
Intercept** 41.2278 0.0001
Ownage 0.0997 0.5223
Ed 3.3974 0.1478
Exp** 0.4174 0.0047
SizeWW 0.3584 0.1764
SizeBM* -1.1159 0.0395
SizeHM -0.4737 0.3336
Asianmen* -1.1695 0.0163
Firm Characteristics
Intercept** 56.2368 0.0001
Firmage** 0.3411 0.0002
Logsales -0.7423 0.2711
Org -1.4031 0.6416
Urban* -5.8797 0.0293
Serv* 9.2744 0.0106
Transp* 15.7464 0.0214
Retail** 13.7248 0.0001
InsRe** 25.4680 0.0010
ConsMin** 15.4076 0.0001
Banking Characteristics 
and Financial Ratios
Intercept** 69.8191 0.0001
Relation** 0.0309 0.0025
Concent -2.6392 0.2398
Mrldeny -5.1584 0.2778
Badcred** -19.9977 0.0001
TDTA** -13.9326 0.0001
Quickrat -0.0217 0.8563
Invassts -2.9620 0.5215
Invtum -0.0404 0.2797
*results significant at the .05 level
**results significant at the .01 level
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Appendix A 
Definition of Variables
Whitemen: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firms was at least 50% owned by a 
white male business owner.
Whitewom: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was a least 50% owned by a white 
women business owner.
Blackmen: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was at least 50% owned by a black 
male business owner.
Hispmen: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was at least 50% owned by a 
Hispanic male business owner.
Asianmen: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was at least 50% owned by an 
Asian male business owner.
Totassts: Total assets for 1998.
Totsales: Total sales for 1998.
Logsales: Log of 1998 sales.
Sizewm: Interaction of logsales* whitewom.
Sizebm: Interaction of logsales*blackmen.
Sizehm: Interaction of logsales*Hispanic men.
Sizeam: Interaction of logsales* Asian men.
Totemp: Total fiill-time equivalent employees.
Firmage: Age of the firm in years.
Ownage: Age of the firm owner in years.
Exp: Owner’s years of business experience.
Acctpay: Accounts payable
AP/Assts: Ratio of accounts payable to total assets.
Inv: Inventory
Inv/Assts; Ratio of inventory to total assets. Values of greater than 1 were capped at 1 to 
eliminate extreme values.
InvTum: Ratio of cost of goods sold plus selling and administrative expense to inventory. 
Values of greater than 100 were capped at 100 to eliminate extreme values.
TDTA: Ratio of total debt to total assets. Values to greater than 1 were capped at 1 since a debt 
ratio of greater than 100 percent is inconsistent with the notion of a “going concern”.
Quickrat: Ratio of accounts receivable plus other current assets to current liabilities. Values of 
greater than 100 were capped at 100 to eliminate extreme values.
Org: Organizational form. Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was organized as a 
limited liability corporation or partnership, or it was an S-corporation or a C-corporation.
Family: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firms was at least 50% owned by one 
family.
Ed: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm owner had attended college.
Serv: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in a service industry.
Manuf: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was a manufacturer.
Transp: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in transportation.
Insre: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in insurance or real estate.
Retail: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in retail or wholesale trade.
Consmin: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in construction or mining.
HighRisk: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was rated as having “significant 
risk” or “high risk” by Dun & Bradstreet.
Bankrupt: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm or its principal owner declared 
bankruptcy within the last 7 years.
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Delinqp=Personal delinquency. Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the principal owner 
was delinquent on personal obligations within the past 3 years.
Delinqb=Business delinquency. Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was 
delinquent on business obligations within the past 3 years.
Judge: Judgments against. Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if judgments were rendered 
against the owner within the past 3 years.
BadCred: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if:
a) the firm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy within the last 7 years, or
b) the principal owner was delinquent on personal obligations within the past 3 years, 
or
c) the firm was delinquent on business obligations within the past 3 years, or
d) judgments were rendered against the owner within the past 3 years.
Trade: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm used trade credit.
Denytrade: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had been denied trade credit. 
Paylate: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm paid the bill after the due date. 
Trade%: Percentage of firm purchases made using trade credit.
Numsupp: Number of trade credit suppliers.
%late: Percentage of trade credit balances paid after the due date.
Cashdisc: Percentage of possible cash discounts taken by firm.
Mrlapp: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm applied for a loan within the previous 
3 years.
Mrldeny: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was denied a loan within the 
previous 3 years.
Noapply: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm did not apply for a loan within the 
previous 3 years because the owner assumed the loan would be denied.
Concent: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the Herfindahl index was greater than 1800.
Urban: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was located in a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area.
Relation: length of relationship with primary bank measured in months.

